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much  defense,  “the  significant  content  that  historical  research  reveals”   is  “a  newly
discovered  present  which  can  only  be  known  and   interpreted   in   the  past  which   it
involves.” It is within the pages of Mead’s The Philosophy of the Present, “The Nature of
the  Past,”  and   select   fragments   in  his  The  Philosophy  of  the  Act  that  a   compelling
hermeneutic account of past, present, and future is developed. 
2 In what follows I draw together what is a largely neglected account of the hermeneutic
thrust  of  Mead’s   late  writings.   In  particular,   I  argue  that  Mead’s  philosophy  of  the
present also amounts to a theory of interpretation. In an open dialogue with a number
of   Hans-Georg   Gadamer’s   most   fundamental   concepts   for   his   philosophical
hermeneutics, I demonstrate how Mead’s notion of emergence in the present of both
past   and   future  neatly   aligns  with  Gadamer’s  notions  of   tradition,  prejudice,   and
application (phronesis), as required for a hermeneutic understanding of what Gadamer
calls  “the   life-powers  of   the  present.”   I  will   trace   the   foundation  of   this  common
ground by highlighting the pivotal influence of Wilhelm Dilthey on both Gadamer and
the young Mead. Then, I will draw out the consequences this mutual influence has on
the  critique  of   the  methodological  historicist   tradition.  Throughout   I  demonstrate
several  missed  opportunities  by  Hans  Joas  at  providing  a  philosophical  hermeneutic
account of Mead’s work. It  is my intention  to  display  how together the  traditions of
philosophical hermeneutics and pragmatism inform one another. 
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The Influence of Dilthey on Mead’s Philosophical
Hermeneutics of the Present 
3 What   is   largely  accepted  as   the  book   that   re-introduced  Mead   to  European   social
thought, Hans Joas’ (1997) G.H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of his Thought makes
no mention of the affinities between the works of Mead and Gadamer. In the same text,
we are reminded, however, of Dilthey’s influence on the young Mead (Joas 1997: 4, 18-9;
see  also   Jung  1995).  From  April  1889   to  October  1891,  Mead  was  registered   in   the
philosophy  department  at  the  University  of  Berlin  (Joas  1997:  218).1 While  there,  he
enrolled in Dilthey’s Ethics and History of Philosophy courses, and undertook to write a
dissertation under Dilthey, the topic of which was a critique of empiricism’s concept of




study  of  Dilthey.  For  Joas  (ibid.:  18),  “this  fact”  of  Dilthey’s  influence  “is  of  essential
importance for an understanding of Mead’s roots.” Now, it is important to note that
this period of study under Dilthey occurred during the same years that hermeneutics
displaced  psychology  as  the  focal  point  of  Dilthey’s  thought  (Bollnow  1936;  see  also
Grondin  1994:  88).  However,  nowhere   in  his  book  on  Mead  does   Joas  provide  any
discussion of Mead’s work in relation to Dilthey’s hermeneutics. Instead, Joas focuses
on   the   psychological   similarities   and   differences   between   the   two   thinkers.   The
“crucial difference” of course is whereas Mead recognized the self as a set of complex
social   structures,  Dilthey   remained   committed   to   developing   a  methodology   that




Interpreting the Emerging Present in Mead and
Gadamer
4 Mead’s The Philosophy of the Present is no doubt a hurried text. Written for the American




were  published  posthumously  under   the   same   title,  with  an  editorial inclusion  of
supplemental  essays.  Similarly,  Gadamer’s  fifth  edition  of  the  original  German  Truth
and  Method  includes   supplemental   essays.   Indeed,  we   know  Gadamer   insisted   on




frame   the  students’  notes  and  Charles  Morris’s  editorial   liberties   in  Mind,  Self,  and
Society as necessary supplements to the reading of Mead.
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5 Possibly  the  most  important  of  Gadamer’s  supplemental  essays  is  his  “Hermeneutics
and Historicism.” Towards the end of this essay, Gadamer makes a set of interrelated
claims  on  philosophical  hermeneutics,  historicism,  and  temporality   from  which  the
discussions that follow will pivot. Gadamer states that the historicist who takes himself
too seriously will in time become un-historical, for that image of the historicist returns






the  past;  that   is  rather  the  obstinate  positivity  of  “naive” historicism.  Historical
thinking has its dignity and its value as truth in the acknowledgment that there is
no  such  thing  as  “the  present,”  but  rather  constantly  changing  horizons  of  the
future  and  past.   It   is  by  no  means  settled   (and  can  never  be  settled)   that  any
particular  perspective   in  which  traditionary  thoughts  present  themselves   is  the
right   one.   “Historical” understanding,  whether   today’s   or   tomorrow’s,  has  no
special  privilege.  It  is  itself  embraced  by  the  changing  horizons  and  moved  with
them. (Ibid.)
6 I take this to mean what Gadamer has called elsewhere in passing “the life-powers of






7 For  those  who  are  familiar  with  Mead’s  philosophy  of  temporality,  Gadamer’s  words
strike  a  glaring  resemblance   to   the  consequences  of  Mead’s  assertion   that  “reality
exists in the present” (Mead 2002: 35; see also Mead 1964: 345-54). This present is not to
be  understood   from   the  abstracted  “knife-edge  present”  of   the  natural  sciences,  a
present devoid of change and passage, but as a specious present (Mead 1972: 220-1; see








where   the   past   conditions   the   novel   event,   which   at   the   same   time   enlists   a
reinterpretation of our past experiences and future expectations.3 The emergent event







experience   in   instants,  rather   the  unity  of  experience   is   the  act   (Mead  1972).  The
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present   entails  both   a  before   and   an   after.  However  partial,   recent  memory   and
immediate anticipation are within its limits. 
9 For Mead, to understand time is to understand the emerging event or novelty within










10 Acknowledging  the  “tang  of  novelty”   in  each  present  experience,  then,  would  pose











with  a  discontinuity  between  cause  and  effect.  What’s  more,  as  soon  as  we  question
causality, Gadamer tells us, we are posing a practical problem (ibid.: 3). The result is the
following:  “[Individuals]  try  to  come  to  grips  with  the  situation   in  which  they   find
themselves  and  find  the  right  course  of  action,  do  what   is  required  and  handle  the
situation   in  the  desired  sense.”  (Ibid.:  4).4 “Understanding,  then,   is  a  special  case  of
applying  something  universal   to  a  particular  situation.”   (Gadamer  2006:  310).  Still,
Gadamer   (2019:  4)   formally  divides   the  causal  and   the  historical   into   two  separate
dimensions   of   study.   Unlike   Gadamer, Mead   explicitly   collapses   the   causal   and
historical   experience   in  his  notion   of   the   specious   present.  There   universal   and
particular, continuity and novelty, causality and surprise, reflection and action are
intimately intertwined. Nonetheless, for both thinkers, historical experiencing involves
direction or purpose as much as it involves a repurposing of the past. It is important to
highlight,   however,   that   both  Mead   and  Gadamer   recognize   purposefulness   as   a
primary   feature  of  any  explanation  of  causality,  and  both  acknowledge  Aristotle’s
causes as the origin of this notion (Gadamer 2019: 7-9, 12; Mead 1972: 641). Insofar as
the teleology of causality is expressed as the successful restoration of continuity in a
novel  present   in  order  to  appropriate   future  conduct,  by  applying  Mead’s  specious
present to Gadamer’s critique of historicism, we then dissolve Gadamer’s “schism” of
causality’s continuity and history’s novelty (Gadamer 2019: 5). 
12 When   rethinking   causality   from   an   historically-effected   consciousness,   then,   the
inevitability of cause and effect allows for continuity and novelty, for “the character of
the  past is  that  it  connects  what  is  unconnected  in  the  merging  of  one  present  into
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continuity,  continuity  would  be  inexperienceable,”  that  is,  the  novelty  of  surprise  is
necessary  for  an  experiencing  of  continuity  and  deliberative  action   (ibid.).  The  past
serves as an integrative function. As such, a constant restructuring of our immediate
experiencing is the natural response to a present that can never be “entirely revealed.”
Here,  Mead’s  notion  of  the  specious  present  advances  Gadamer’s  rebuke  of  Dilthey’s
“naïve historicism.”
13 In “the age of unconditional faith in science” (Gadamer 2019: 6) the knife-edge present
prevails   where   the   belief   in   a   wholly   revealed   in-itself   present-as-an-instant   is
achievable. Mead’s specious present, much like Gadamer’s hermeneutical experience,







explicit   distinction   between   an   open   (specious)   present   versus   a   closed   (instant)
present. Instead, Gadamer leaves himself open to the misinterpretation that there is no
method  whatsoever   from  which  to  arrive  at  a  more  accurate  understanding  of  the
present. For Gadamer states in the Afterword to his Truth and Method: 





the  essence  of   research   is  much   less  merely  applying   the  usual  methods   than









it,  and   in  some  degree  reconstructing   them   from   its  own  standpoint”  we  notice  a
conceptual   resemblance   to  Gadamer’s  picture  of  a   fusion  of  horizons,  where  “the
horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past” (Gadamer 2006: 305). Nearly
identical   in   tone  and  content   to  Mead,  Gadamer  continues:  “There   is  no  more  an
isolated horizon of the present in itself than there are historical horizons which have to
be acquired. Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing
by  themselves.”   (Gadamer  2006:  305;  his  emphasis).  Unbeknownst   to  him,  Natanson
(1953: 772) captures the link between the two nicely when he states that “the content
and meaning of the past event are, for Mead, structured and continually restructured
in  terms  of  a  present  that  is  itself  within  a  horizon  of  temporal  movement.”  What’s
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horizons captures the  same contextualizing experience  of the  interpreted present  as
does Mead’s specious present.
15 When  Miller  (1943:  44-6)  reflects  on  what  starts  the  scientist  thinking  for  Mead,  his
interpretation leads him to discuss such notions as “prejudice,” “hypothesis,” and even
“tradition.” Yet it is not only Natanson (1953), Tonness (1932) or Miller (1943) whose
discourse  on  Mead  shares   in  character   that  of  Gadamer.   In  a   fragment   in  his  The
Philosophy of the Act Mead emphasizes the knowing of the past and causal future within
the  present  as  a  hermeneutical  task.7 As   it   is  an  often-ignored  passage,   it   is  worth
quoting Mead at length here. He states: 
The   passing   present,   compounded   of   the   past   which   is   determined   by   the
interpretation  of  the  present  and   the   future  which   comes   to   us   as   alternative
possibilities, is what we have. The past is always necessary, but the past which is
there   is  not  necessary,   i.e.   is  dependent  upon   the   future  which  determines   the
present and its interpretation. It is the emergent that determine the selection of the
futures   and,  hence,   the   pasts   that   are   their   so-called   causes.  The   values   are
absolutes   that   arrive.   The   pasts   that   succeed   one   another   could   never   be
prophesied from one another. Nothing is lost, but that which arrives that is novel
gives a continually new past. Its reality is in its interpretation of the present. (Mead,
1972: 616; emphasis added) 
16 In  what  follows,  I  will  focus  on  how  Mead’s  understanding  of  how  the  emergent   in
experience   (that   is,  the  event  that  brings forth  the  present),  to  use  a  Gadamerian,
phrase  “speaks  to  us.”  To  shift  toward  this  direction,  I  will  note  first  the  affinity  in
language between these two thinkers themselves. 
 
Interpreting the Present as Understanding the
Emerging Event
17 Before settling on the more evocative title of Truth and Method, Gadamer played with
the idea of calling his manuscript Understanding and Event (Grondin 2003: 13). In light of
this,   a   comparison   to  Mead’s   The  Philosophy  of  the  Present may   advance   a   clearer
comparison, as Mead often uses the words present, emergent, happening, novelty, and
event interchangeably (Mead 1964; 2002). How does one come to understand an event?
And  what  comes  along  with  us  when  we   interpret  such  an  event?  Both  Mead  and




(Gadamer  2007:  242).  As  a  participating,  it  is  inherently  practically  oriented.  It  is  an
application   (Gadamer  2006:  305-20).  As  Hoy  aptly  puts   it,  Gadamer’s  emphasis  on
interpretation   as   application   is   a   “philosophical   point   about   the   interest-bound
character  of  all  knowledge”  (Hoy  1982:  111).  Interpretations  always  serve  a  purpose.
For  Mead,   the   locus  of  reality   is   the  present.  And  since  each  present   is  a  socially
mediated  event,  each  present  participates  in  the  sociality  of  traditions  (Mead  2002).
Mead defines an “emergent event” as “the occurrence of something which is more than
the   processes   that   have   led   up   to   it   and  which   by   its   change,   continuance,   or
disappearance,   adds   to   later   passages   a   content   they  would   not   otherwise   have
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19 For  Gadamer  as  for  Mead  we  apply  a  reframing  of  the  past  as   it  meets  the  present
experience in order that we can achieve a future task (Gadamer 2006: 291; Mead 2002:
57).  So,  when  Gadamer  says   that  all  statements  are  an  answer   to  a  question  he   is
implying that each interpretative statement is future-oriented, that is, a task, for “it
responds to a challenge” (Gadamer 2007: 242). Gadamer explicitly acknowledges this in
a  later  article  where  he  gives  a  historical  account  of  the  notions  of  subjectivity  and
intersubjectivity   (Gadamer   2000:   280-1).   Gadamer   does   so   by   highlighting   a
Heideggerian inspired notion of “givenness-on-the-way,” where Dasein as thrown begins
its  present  with  prejudice   to  a  non-given   future.  From   this  perspective,  nothing   is














tradition  that  our  historical  understanding   limits the  arbitrariness  of  our  particular
perspective   and   reinforces   a  whole   “history   of   interpretations”   of   the   emergent
present (Warnke 1987: 80). To note, this notion is closely related to what Mead (2002)
means  when  he  describes  emergence  as  a  social  present.  “The  general  structure  of






human  sciences   in  a  particular  method. For  Gadamer  as  much  as  Mead,   then,  our
understanding  of  our  present  emerges  out  of  our   lived  past,  both   in  our   individual
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22 In  Beyond  Objectivism  and  Relativism:  Science,  Hermeneutics,  and  Praxis,  Bernstein  calls




anticipatory  –  always  open   to   future   testing  and   transformation”   (Bernstein  1983:




“[t]he   passing   present,   compounded   of   the   past   which   is   determined   by   the
interpretation   of   the   present   and   the   future   which   comes   to   us   as   alternative
possibilities, is what we have. The past is always necessary, but the past which is there
is not necessary, i.e., is dependent upon the future which determines the present and
its   interpretation.”   (Mead  1972:  616).  When  Mead  describes   the  passing  present  as
“what we have” he is reminding us, much like Gadamer had, that there is no “special




prejudice,   though   our  prejudices   are  never   incorrigible.  To  highlight   the   affinity
between  these  two  thinkers,  then,  we  must  heed  Gadamer’s  plea  to  “fundamentally




Prejudice as Hypothesis: Integrating Gadamer and
Mead’s Philosophy of the Emergent Present 
23 Gadamer’s (2006: 273) claim that “the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is
the  prejudice  against  prejudice   itself”   is  not  a  call   for  accepting   the  authority  of
prejudice   and   tradition  uncritically.9  It   is   also  not   an   affirmation  of  prejudice   as
understood to the modern ear. Rather, his discourse on prejudice is a genealogy of the
origins  of  the  use  of  prejudice  in  understanding.  And  it  is  in  this  genealogy  that  we
come to find the modern conception of prejudice, as it began in the Enlightenment, as a
distorted view of the notion. The Enlightenment critique of religion forged a complete
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Actually,  “prejudice” means  a  judgment  that  is  rendered  before  all  the  elements
that determine a situation have been fully examined. In German legal terminology a
“prejudice”  is  a  provisional   legal  verdict  before  the  final  verdict   is  reached.  For
someone involved in a legal dispute, this kind of judgment against him affects his
chances   adversely.   Accordingly,   the   French   préjudice,   as   well   as   the   Latin
praejudicium,  means   simply  “adverse  effect,”  “disadvantage,”  “harm.” But   this
negative sense is only derivative. The negative consequence depends precisely on
the  positive  validity,  the  value  of  the  provisional decision  as  a  prejudgment,  like
that of any precedent. Thus “prejudice” certainly does not necessarily mean a false




24 After  excavating   the  original   conception  of  prejudice,   its  original  usage  begins   to
approximate  the  same  linguistic  function  as  a hypothesis.  Much  like  a  hypothesis,  a
prejudice   is  a  “judgment  that   is  rendered  before  all  the  elements  that  determine  a
situation  have  been  fully  examined.”  It   is  as  “provisional”  as  a  hypothesis.  In  what
follows,   I  will  argue   for   the  practical  comparability  between   the  everyday  original
notion of prejudice with the formal – dare I say, methodological – notion of hypothesis
in  scientific  discovery.10 By  doing  so,  the  similarities  between  Gadamer  and  Mead’s
philosophies of the present and emergence will come to light. 



















consciousness   are   not   at   his   free   disposal.   He   cannot   separate   in   advance   the
productive prejudices that enable understanding from the prejudices that hinder it and
lead to misunderstanding” (Gadamer 2006: 295). Rather, as Mead notes, an individual’s
“foresight  does  not  go  beyond   the   testing  of  his  hypothesis”   (Mead  1964:  3).  Our
prejudices, just as our hypotheses, are those contents of a problematic situation that
are “immediately functional” (Mead 1972: 219). They initiate an act. They are our initial
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the  initial  stage  of  Mead’s  experimental  method  of  both  the  sciences  and  individual
conduct,  begins  with  a  prejudiced  “what   is   there”   that   is  always  articulated  as  a
hypothesis  to  a  present  problem.  Where  for  Gadamer  (2007:  242)  all  statements  are
questions,  for  Mead  (1972:  88-9),  all  propositions  are  hypothetical  questions,  and  as












positions  do  not  get   in   the  way  of  understanding  but  are  rather   the  conditions  of
possibility for it.
 
Dilthey, Mead, and Gadamer: A Neglected
Philosophical Tradition
29 Recognizing  this  affinity  between  Gadamer  and  Mead,  and  their  mutual  criticism  of
Dilthey,12 I would like to turn now to the question, given the mutual influence Dilthey
had  on  both   thinkers,   that   this  common  ground  between   the   two  have  yet   to  be
highlighted by Mead scholars, particularly Hans Joas (see also Jung 1995).
30 It   is   only   in   his  more   recent   essay   titled   “Pragmatism   and  Historicism:  Mead’s
Philosophy   of   Temporality   and   the   Logic   of  Historiography”   that   Joas   begins   to
articulate   an   encounter   between   Mead’s   pragmatism   and   hermeneutics,   broadly
understood. I say “broadly understood” because Joas only uses the term hermeneutics





to do so is likely due to the fact that Mead’s The Philosophy of the Present primarily refers
to the natural sciences whereas Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is motivated by
a critique of the historicists’ impulse to ground the human sciences in natural science’s
rigid   methodologies   (see   Bernstein   1983).   For   Joas   is   right   in   emphasizing   that
“common to both [Mead and Dilthey] […] was the intention of establishing a basis for
objective  knowledge  and  open-mindedness  towards  the  natural  sciences”  (Joas  1997:
41).   However,   Joas   himself   admits   that   Mead’s   attempts   to   “naturalize”   mental
phenomena were constructed in non-reductionist forms. Alicia Garcia Ruiz (2013: 44)
states this point more clearly in her essay on Mead, “The Concept of the Present and
Historical  Experience,”  when  she  stresses  that  the  link  between  Mead  and  Dilthey  is
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present   focus  on   the  possibility  of   infinite   reconstructions.  For  Dilthey,  historical
knowledge  can  have  a   foundation,  whereas   for  Mead,  knowledge  of   the  past   is  as
hypothetical as the future (Mead, 2002: 44; see also Lee 1963). Viewed in this way, The
Philosophy of the Present presents a damning critique of the philosophies of the natural
and  historical  sciences  of  time.  “We  orient ourselves  not  with  reference  to  the  past
which was a present within which the emergent appeared,” Mead states, “but in such a
restatement   of   the   past   as   conditioning   the   future   that   we   may   control   its
reappearance.” (Mead 2002: 46; emphasis added). Here, Mead’s approach to historical
knowledge looks more like an orientation to understanding the present than a specific
method.  Thus,  Mead’s  philosophy  of   temporality,  now  reconsidered  as  a   theory  of
understanding, is  as  much  a  critique  of  the  natural  sciences  as  they  stand  as  it  is  a
critique   of  historicism.  Gadamer   (2000),  we   know,   provides   the   same   critique   of




both   thinkers  were,   to  use  Gadamer’s  words  noted  above,  responding   to   the  same
challenge. 
31 The  current  that  runs  through Dilthey,  Mead, and  Gadamer, then,  is the  notion  that




orientation  to  the  future  funded  by  a  reconstructed  past  than  it  does  with  Dilthey’s
methodological historicism.




33 Joas  (2016)  believes  Mead  to  have  failed  to  think  of  the  moral  universalism  of  role-
taking   in  historical  terms.  As  Mead’s  theory  of  role-taking  plays  a   large  part   in  his
general   theory  of   intersubjectivity,  recognizing  how   the  notion  of   intersubjectivity
arrived historically can provide the answers that Joas so seeks from Mead. In Gadamer’s




the  conceptual  origin  of  persons  with  its  Greek  expression  in  prosopon,  meaning  the
“masks of actors, and hence also for the roles played by the actors in Attic theater,” and
continuing with the Latin, persona, and traces it all the way to Luther who “connected
the concept of person most closely with that of fides, the rule of belief.” Gadamer (2000)
concludes   the   article   by  noting  how  history   “remarkably”   lost   the philosophical
conceptual language of persons to the modern concept of subjectivity, where if persons
had remained a part of our philosophical discourse, it would more neatly align with our
current theories of intersubjectivity. Perhaps, then, Joas could have benefited from
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having a conversation with Gadamer and the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics




34 It   is  only   in  Mead’s   later  writings  that  we  may  disinter  a  philosophic  hermeneutic
account of the present. In this regard, the reader may have noticed the absence of any
reference   to  Mead’s   famous  Mind,  Self,  and  Society  in   the  previous  pages.  There   is
historical purpose to this decision. First, along with Huebner (2014) I believe Mind, Self,
and  Society  has   nearly  monopolized   all   discussion   of  Mead’s   philosophy,   in   turn
neglecting   the  historical  significance  of  his   later  writings.  Secondly,  but  equally  as




particularly  his  Carus   lectures  and  his  article  “The  Nature  of   the  Past,”   they  were
written of his own hand with a view towards a public audience.
35 Considering   the   above   points,   it   is   best   first   to   read   Mead   as   a   hermeneutic
philosopher, and then turn to a reading of Mind, Self, and Society, a text that no doubt
was   born   out   of   a  hermeneutic   orientation   and   begs   to   be   read  with   the   same
historically-effected consciousness that Gadamer champions. 
36 Interestingly, though recognizing the importance of treating Mead as a philosopher of
history,  Huebner  (2014,  2016)  neglects  to   identify  the  hermeneutic  thrust  of  Mead’s
writings on history and the present. Huebner is not alone in his missed opportunity to
explicitly   identify  the  affinities  between  Mead’s   later  writings  and  the  hermeneutic
tradition. As we noted, Joas (1997, 2016) too ignores any hermeneutic import to Mead as
historicist,  even  when  acknowledging   the   influence  of  Dilthey  on   the  young  Mead.




Though   pragmatist   scholar   Rosenthal   (2000)   emphasizes   the   importance   of
interpretation in Mead’s philosophy of the present, she too misses an opportunity to
reflect  on  the  affinities  between  Mead’s  pragmatism  and  the  hermeneutic  tradition.








more   robust   account   of   the   affinities   between   pragmatism   and   philosophical
hermeneutics must include a detailed discussion of Dilthey and Heidegger and to what
extent language, the self, consciousness, sociality, perspectives and role-taking plays a
part   in  Mead’s  hermeneutics.   It  would  also serve  our  argument  well   if  Gadamer’s
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distinction of experience as Erlebnis and Erfahrung were explored in relation to Mead’s





at  Dilthey,  and   in  turn,   ignores  Gadamer’s  philosophical  hermeneutics.  Rather  than
compare   Dilthey’s   historicism   to   Mead’s   philosophy   of   time,   I   interpret   Mead’s
philosophy  of  the  present  as  an  attempt to  move  beyond  Dilthey’s   ‘naive’  historicist
hermeneutics, and as such, Mead essentially provides a theory of applied interpretation
of   the   present   that   simultaneously   respects   our   traditions   and   prejudices   while
remaining  open  to  future  possibilities.  As  a  result,  Mead’s  philosophy  of  the  present
aligns  more  with  Gadamer’s  philosophical  hermeneutics   than  with  methodological
historicism. 
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NOTES






is  more  than  the  processes  that  have   led  up  to   it  and  which  by   its  change,  continuance,  or







other  than  an  adjustment  to  the  thing”  (Grondin  2003:  86).  That   is,  understanding   is  finding
“accord” with   the  past   in   the  present   in   order   to   “anticipate”   the   future   (ibid.).   For   the
similarities  between  this  account  of  Gadamerian  understanding  and  Mead’s  philosophy  of  the





to  obviate   the  present  difficulty,   and   the   test  of   this   effort   lies   in   the  possibility  of   this
readjustment fitting into the world as it is.” (Mead 1964: 5).
5. Mead goes on to say, “Is there a similar error in the conception of correction of the past error













prejudice   again   (Grondin   2003:   90).   It   is   likely   that   due   to   how   intrenched   the   negative
connotations of prejudice are to modern ears, Gadamer thought his attempt to rehabilitate the
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original use of prejudice led to more misunderstanding than elucidation of the main purpose for
enlisting   the  notion  –   the   inescapability,  even   for   the  methodological  scientist,  of  historical
situatedness. 




Mead   refers   to   the  “logical  analysis  of   the  experimental  method”  as  “merely   the
elaboration  of   the   simple  processes  of  everyday   inference  by  which  we  meet  our
constantly recurring difficulties” (Mead 1972: 82-3).
11. Compare   this   to  Gadamer’s  note  on   the  relationship  between  hermeneutics  and  science:
“Hermeneutics   also  has   relevance   to   the   theory   of   science   in   that  hermeneutic   reflection


















fundamental  concepts, I  demonstrate  how  Mead’s  notion  of  emergence  in  the  present  of  both
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